Pricing the Limits to Growth from Minerals Depletion by Weitzman, Martin L.
 
Pricing the Limits to Growth from Minerals Depletion
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Weitzman, Martin L. 1999. Pricing the limits to growth from
minerals depletion. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2): 691-
706.
Published Version doi:10.1162/003355399556025
Accessed February 18, 2015 3:25:02 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3708467
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAPRICING THE LIMITS TO GROWTH
FROM MINERALS DEPLETION
MARTIN L. WEITZMAN
This paper evaluates the loss of global welfare from exhaustion of nonrenew-
able resources, such as oil. The underlying methodology represents an empirical
application of some recent developments in the theory of green accounting and
sustainability. The paper estimates that the world loses the equivalent of about 1
percent of ﬁnal consumption per year from ﬁniteness of the earth’s resources,
compared with a counterfactual trajectory where global extraction of minerals is
allowed to remain forever constant at today’s ﬂow rates and extraction costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spurred by the ‘‘energy crisis,’’ a severe loss of conﬁdence
erupted on the world scene of the 1970s concerning the planet’s
ability to cope with exhaustion of nonrenewable resources such as
oil. The ensuing debate about ‘‘limits to growth’’ was hardly the
ﬁrst expression of such concerns. Nor is it likely to be the last, as
this general theme seems to repeat itself periodically throughout
history.1
Why doesn’t this issue ever get resolved? To be more speciﬁc
here, take the example of petroleum. Why can’t economics come
up with a credible estimate of what ‘‘running out of oil’’ will cost
the world in terms of the implied limits to growth of future
consumption?
To ask this question is almost to answer it. Imagine what kind
of a modeling effort would be required to give a full evaluation. It
would presumably involve solving a computable general equilib-
rium model having dynamic speciﬁcations of oil demand and
supply response functions, a sophisticated treatment of expecta-
tions, knowledge of world oil reserves and exploration costs,
estimates of elasticities of substitution between oil and all other
relevant factors of production, sectoral projections of technological
progress, learning curves, macroeconomic growth forecasts, and
so forth, and so on. Furthermore, at the end of the day, any
answers would only be as believable as the estimates, projections,
and assumptions behind the model.
Yet, there is another possible approach here—from the dual
1. As just one famous example, Stanley Jevons was worried about coal
exhaustion in 1865.
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speciﬁcation, suppose that we took more of an indirect approach
by looking at the relevant prices. After all, we know in a general
way that a lot of information is compressed into a price. To take an
extreme example here, we have always sensed intuitively that if
the world is going to exhaust its oil reserves within a few
generations, and if, additionally, there were to be disastrous
consequences for living standards of the people alive at that time,
then it should show up now in a relatively ‘‘high’’ price of today’s
oil. Conversely, if today’s price of oil is comparatively ‘‘low,’’it must
mean that the limits to growth from running out of oil are not so
constraining—in some sense.
The question then becomes can we turn this kind of a
qualitative heuristic story into a more exact quantitative method
for ‘‘pricing out’’the limits to growth from minerals depletion. The
answer is yes, under certain circumstances, and it involves an
application of the modern theory of comprehensive or ‘‘green’’
national income accounting.
This paper has two aims. The primary aim is to provide an
empirical assessment of the limits to growth from minerals
exhaustion by appropriately ‘‘pricing out’’ depletion. A secondary
aim is to introduce—by using an actual speciﬁc example—a way of
reasoning, class of models, and set of issues that characterize the
contemporary economic theory of ‘‘green accounting’’ and
‘‘sustainability.’’
We start with the simplest possible formulation that captures
the essence of the problem. Later we discuss where and how this
simple model generalizes.
II. THE MODEL
Suppose that a stylized aggregated economy consists of three
basic types of goods. Consumption C and net investment I are
interchangeably manufactured, while the natural resource E is an
intermediate good extracted from an exhaustible stock. Through-
out the paper consumption will serve as the numeraire. Let
investment also be valued at a price of one, while the comparable
net price (price minus marginal extraction cost) of a unit of the
exhaustible resource is P.
A naive measure of net produced income might be C 1 I.
However, this measure disregards resource depletion. Suppose
that we conceptualize income more broadly as representing the
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further that we think of PE as being a form of temporary income
that happens to come out of a ﬁnite stockpile under the ground,
but is otherwise perfectly substitutable with C or I. Then,
converting both manufactured investment and extracted income
linearly into ‘‘as-if consumption,’’the expression,
(1) C 1 I 2 PE,
might be seen as representing the largest permanently maintain-
able level of consumption, with the temporary income term
(2) PE
being a ‘‘welfare cost’’ of resource exhaustability, because it
represents the nonpermanent part of naively measured present
income C 1 I that cannot be counted upon for the future.
The main problem with the above argument is the assump-
tion of perfect substitutability between C, I, and E. While it might
be all right to regard manufactured consumption and manufac-
tured investment as trading off against each other linearly
(indeed, interchangeability of C and I is the standard assumption
in almost all aggregative growth models), it is quite another
matter to pretend that E is also linearly substitutable with C or I
over a nonmarginal range.
Actually,thecomplicatednonlinearwayinwhichtheexhaust-
ible resource interacts with capital when it enters the production
process will largely determine economic performance over time.A
lot will hinge on the degree of substitutability between K and E.
Therefore, this aspect of the problem must be expressed quite
generally in a paper dedicated to analyzing the limits to growth
from declining E. Nevertheless, the paper shows that as long as C
and I are interchangeably produced (as in the traditional formula-
tion), the above simple story identifying PE as the welfare cost of
depletion is essentially correct. Perhaps surprisingly, a standard
linear trade-off between C and I is sufficient to drive the powerful
result that what looks like a marginal valuation of E, which by
rights should hold only locally, in actuality possesses the strong
global interpretation of the simple story.
We begin with the most basic plausible model for analyzing
the limits to growth.
Let K(t) be the aggregate stock of capital at time t, with
2. See, e.g., Hicks [1946], Chapter 14.
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stock of nonrenewable resources (hereinafter oil, for short) at time
t, whose corresponding extraction ﬂow rate is denoted E(t). Let
X(t) represent manufacturing capacity at time t.
We treat here a technology of the form,
(3) X(t) 5 F(K(t),E(t)),
where F(K,E) is the aggregate net production function, while X
represents productive capacity.
In the spirit of the abstraction underlying traditional macro-
economic aggregation, which treats manufactured consumption
and manufactured investment as if they are essentially differ-
ently packaged products of the same production capacity, we
assume here the linear trade-off,
(4) C(t) 1 I(t) 5 X(t).
The corresponding accumulation equations are
(5) K ˙ (t) 5 I(t),
and
(6) S ˙(t) 52 E(t).
The production system (3)–(6) represents about the simplest
meaningful way to combine the Ramsey and Hotelling models.
Note two basic underlying assumptions. The exhaustible resource
E enters only through the aggregate production function, while C
and I are perfect substitutes. These two assumptions strike me as
entirely reasonable at the level of abstraction appropriate to this
aggregate model, but they will end up driving the strong results
that follow.
Note that no assumptions are being made about how K and E
interact, so that in principle the aggregate net production function
(3) could take virtually any form. The central question at this level
of aggregation is the extent to which reproducible capital K can be
used to offset the limits to growth posed by running out of the
exhaustible resource E. The model does not prejudge this issue,
but rather allows us to infer an answer empirically, which is the
main point of the paper.
The model is closed here by supposing a dynamic competitive
equilibrium with real rate of return r. This means a trajectory
5C*(t),K*(t),S*(t),P*(t)6 along which is simultaneously satisﬁed
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 694
Page694
@xyserv1/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec114-2/DIV_064a10 donnthe conditions,
(7)
­F
­K 0
*
5 r,
(8)
­F
­E 0
*
5 P*(t),
(9)
P ˙ *(t)
P*(t)
5 r.
In defense of equation (7), I think it fair to state as a stylized
fact that the own rate of return on consumption has been
essentially trendless over time.3 One could argue that the measur-
able entity corresponding most closely to this concept is the
annual after-tax real return on capital (because it approximately
deﬁnes the relevant intertemporal consumption trade-off faced by
the average citizen in deciding how much to save).As a very rough
approximation, a trendless round ﬁgure of 5 percent might be
used for this interest rate in the postwar period.4
The dual variable P*(t) represents the price minus marginal
extraction cost of a barrel of oil in the ground at time t, sometimes
called the ‘‘net price’’ or ‘‘Hotelling rent.’’ Equation (8) speciﬁes
that in competitive equilibrium the Hotelling rent or net price of a
barrelofoilinthegroundjustequalsitsabove-groundnetvaluein
production. Formula (9) is the famous Hotelling rule, which
indicates the asset pricing path that must be followed by an
exhaustible resource in competitive equilibrium.
How might we describe development of the model economy
(3)–(9)? Over time, oil is running out. Behind the scenes, an
attempt is being made to substitute the services of capital for the
services of oil. The outcome depends on many things—including
how large are ultimate oil reserves, how severe is the effect of
diminishing returns to capital, and, most especially, the degree to
which accumulated capital can replace oil. With a low elasticity of
substitution, there may be severe limits to growth. (In the most
3. This is one of Kaldor’s famous ‘‘stylized facts’’about the growth of advanced
industrial economies. (For a discussion see Solow [1970], p. 3.) Nordhaus [1994], in
his section titled ‘‘Empirical Evidence on the Return on Capital’’ on p. 125,
summarizes a number of studies that are consistent with a trendless interpreta-
tion.
4. Nordhaus [1995], Jorgenson [1994], or Feldstein [1997] could each be cited
to justify this very rough conclusion about lack of persistent trend ﬂuctuating
around 5 percent per year.
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zero over time, so that life as we know it would eventually cease.)
Conversely, a sufficiently high elasticity of substitution presents
much less of a threat to eventual well-being.
The whole point of the paper is that we would like to have
some empirical sense, using current readily available indicators,
about which ones among the above possible features actually
characterize our world, and therefore what sort of growth scenario
awaits us in the future.
As we have noted, a number of considerations determine the
actual welfare losses associated with ﬁniteness of oil stocks—
including the ultimate size of these stocks, the eventual degree of
diminishing returns to capital, and the limiting elasticity of
substitution between capital and oil—none of which are readily
observable now. Thus, in undertaking the numerical exercise of
this paper, we are essentially being challenged to predict at the
present time what will happen in the future.
We wish to pose rigorously the following question. ‘‘What is
the welfare loss from running out of oil?’’ In answering this
question, we must, in effect, project not only what future history
will be, but also the counterfactual thought experiment of what
future history would be if we never ran out of oil. To begin with,
then, we need a base-case measure of welfare, against which we
can calibrate the outcome of the counterfactual thought experi-
ment we need to perform.
As a ﬁrst step on this path, let us agree to measure welfare for
the base case of the actual world we happen to live in (where
stocks of oil are ﬁnite) by the simple linear indicator:
(10) W* 5e
0
`
C*(t)e2rt dt.
In words, our measure of welfare here is the present dis-
counted value of consumption, where the discount rate is the
competitive-equilibriumownrateofreturnonconsumptiongener-
ated by the economy itself. There are several possible ways of
defending the above form as a welfare indicator. First of all, (10) is
intuitively appealing, being just a weighted sum of consumption
where the weights are, naturally, based on ‘‘the’’ interest rate. At
perhaps a somewhat deeper level, we are assuming that the
economy here is acting as if it is implicitly maximizing an
objective function of the form (10), so why not use this same linear
form explicitly to approximate the changes in welfare associated
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perform?5
The guiding spirit of this paper is not fancy. We are not
expecting anything more than a rough estimate. All we are
looking for is some handle on an important problem where none
currently exists. We are using a very simple model. Here we will
be satisﬁed just to have some sense of the average difference in
consumption between our own world, where we will someday run
out of oil, and a hypothetical world where we never run out of oil.
For these purposes (10) is a more than adequate indicator.
Now we come to a serious modeling issue. We want to answer
the following question. ‘‘What is the welfare loss from running out
of oil?’’ But then, in effect, we must specify what it means for
future history to unfold in a world just like our own, except that
‘‘oil never runs out.’’
In our actual world, present consumption of oil is E*(0), and it
must (eventually) decline over time because oil stocks are limited.
Now suppose that this were not so. Suppose that we interpret
‘‘never running out’’ of oil to mean that we have been given a
miraculous gift of many spigots distributed throughout the world,
which deliver a total ﬂow of E*(0) barrels of oil per year every year,
forever, at this year’s real extraction costs. In other words,
suppose that, instead of being nonrenewable, oil was a renewable
resource. The counterfactual historical thought experiment being
proposed here is to imagine what would happen to consumption if
everything else were the same in the world economy except that,
instead of being constrained by the ﬁnite world stock of oil S(0), we
were instead constrained by this year’s ﬂow of oil E*(0), so that oil
will never become any scarcer than it is now.6 What, we want to
know, would then happen to consumption?
Let 5C**(t),K**(t)6 be a solution of the following hypothetical
optimal growth problem:
maximize
(11) e
0
`
C(t)e2rt dt
5. Along with a transversality condition (unstated here), equations (7)–(9)
represent the necessary duality conditions for the optimal control problem of
maximizing an objective function of the form (10) subject to (3)–(6) with S(t) $ 0,
K(t) $ 0. For more on this duality interpretation see Weitzman [1976]. Implicitly,
equations (7)–(9) are describing an interior solution.
6. An alternative approach would assume that the real price of oil remains
forever constant at today’s level, while the economy is rebated the amount it
spends on oil as a lump sum transfer. This approach gives the same answer, but it
is slightly more difficult to analyze.
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(12) C(t) 1 I(t) 5 F(K(t),E*(0)),
and
(13) K ˙ (t) 5 I(t),
and starting from the aggregate capital stock being today’s actual
value K(0).
Then deﬁne
(14) W** ;e
0
`
C**(t)e2rt dt
and
(15)
DW
W
;
W** 2 W*
W**
.
In the paper, DW/W, deﬁned above, is taken to be an appropri-
ate measure of the world’s ‘‘welfare loss from running out of oil.’’
This expression might be described fairly as representing the
average percentage difference in consumption between the two
scenarios.
III. THE MAIN RESULT
It might be feared that it is difficult or impossible to actually
determine DW/W because a lot of information seems to be re-
quired. Actually, the needed information is reduced here to a
simple form requiring only knowledge of current indicators. The
following proposition represents the main theoretical result.
PROPOSITION. For the model of this paper,
(16)
DW
W
5
P*(0) · E*(0)
C*(0) 1 I*(0)
.
Proof of the Proposition. We are, in effect, comparing the
solutions of two optimal growth problems here. The ﬁrst problem
(*), which maximizes (10) subject to (3)–(6), is interpreted here as
if being a description of the actual history of the economy. The
second optimal growth problem (**) maximizes the same objective
function (11), but under the alternative counterfactual con-
straints (12) and (13).
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e C**(t)e2rt dt. To help us with this task, we can invoke here a
fundamental valuation result, which states that, for a time-
independent economy in dynamic competitive equilibrium,
current inclusive NDP is the annuity equivalent of future
consumption.7
Applying this result in turn to economies (*) and (**), we can
then write
(17) C*(0) 1 I*(0) 2 P*(0) · E*(0) 5 rW*
and
(18) C**(0) 1 I**(0) 5 rW**.
From the structure of the two optimal growth problems, it
must hold that
(19) C*(0) 1 I*(0) 5 F(K(0),E*(0))
and
(20) C**(0) 1 I**(0) 5 F(K(0),E*(0)).
Plugging (17)–(20) into (15), we then have the desired result
(16). h
The proposition has the following interpretation. In this
simple economy what would be measured by a national income
statistician as ‘‘conventional NDP’’is
(21) NDPconventional 5 C*(0) 1 I*(0).
Expression (21) is clearly a misleading indicator of the power
to produce—and hence to consume—over time, because it fails to
account properly for the role that depletable oil plays in propping
up current production at artiﬁcially high levels. Intuitively, future
production possibilities would seem to be more completely cap-
tured by the ‘‘green NDP’’expression:
(22) NDPgreen 5 C*(0) 1 I*(0) 2 P*(0) · E*(0).
The simple-minded heuristic answer to the question, ‘‘What is
the average loss from running out of oil,’’is the difference between
NDPconventional and NDPgreen:
(23) DW 5 P*(0) · E*(0).
7. This is a translation of the basic message in Weitzman [1976]. Note that
everything is intended to be evaluated at the constant rate of interest.
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economy, the above simple-minded heuristic answer is exactly the
correct response to a rigorously posed version of the (counterfac-
tual) question that is being asked. The result is somewhat striking
because a marginal valuation is being used, in this particular
instance, to evaluate a discrete change.
Before applying this result empirically, we should understand
better how far the theorem can be stretched to include more
realistic situations. Toward this end, we now sketch what would
be the appropriate extension of the basic idea to cover (1) multiple
capital goods, (2) multiple exhaustible minerals, (3) a more
general net production function where extraction costs of miner-
als may increase as remaining stocks decline, (4) technological
progress, and (5) some other issues.
Turning to the ﬁrst task, consider a multisector generaliza-
tion of the one-sector Ramsey technology, where the production
possibilities frontier is now an n-dimensional hyperplane rather
than a two-dimensional straight line trade-off between consump-
tion and investment. A little reﬂection reveals that the critical
assumption in the proof of the main theorem is the linearity of the
surface describing current production possibilities between the
single consumption good and the n 2 1 investment goods, not its
dimensionality.As long as the curvature of the current production
possibilities frontier is relatively small (over the range of changes
induced in current consumption-investment patterns by the coun-
terfactual thought experiment of never running out of oil), the
proof goes through.
A straight-line transformation between C and I is the stan-
dard unchallenged assumption in aggregative growth theory—
because it greatly simpliﬁes the analysis and we cannot tell a
convincing story why the price of I should change systematically
relative to the price of C. I think the same logic holds here. We
have little notion of how running out of exhaustible forms of
energy will affect the relative price of capital and might as well
adopt the standard assumption here.
The model has thus far treated just one exhaustible resource.
But there is no difficulty making an extension to cover the general
situation of m different nonrenewable minerals. In this case E is
interpreted as a vector of m resource extraction ﬂows, while P
stands for the corresponding m-vector of net resource prices.
Note the extreme generality of the above interpretation of K
and E as multidimensional input vectors, in the sense that the
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virtually any form. Furthermore, there is no problem in allowing
net production to vary with the stocks of remaining minerals, so
that X 5 F(K,E,S), which is a way of modeling dependence of
extraction costs on remaining stocks. In this case the simple
Hotelling rule is modiﬁed into a more complicated generalization,
but all of the conclusions of the model remain.
As for technological progress, when there is a residual
shift-factor present, then the production system is no longer
time-independent. In this case, the fundamental valuation result
(17) is replaced by the more inclusive expression,
(24) rW* 5 C*(0) 1 I*(0) 2 P*(0) · E*(0) 1 T*(0),
where T*(0) is a residual term that captures the power of
time-dependent atmospheric shift factors like technological
progress, which are not accounted for, to increase annuity-
equivalent consumption by expanding the production possibilities
frontier over time.8 Assuming that technological progress in-
creases production possibilities in both worlds by the same
‘‘atmospherically neutral’’shift, then
(25) rW** 5 C**(0) 1 I**(0) 1 T*(0),
and
(26)
DW
W
5
P*(0) · E*(0)
C*(0) 1 I*(0) 1 T*(0)
.
The above speciﬁcation of technological progress amounts to
postulating here a base case where the present discounted value
of residual shift factors is the same in both worlds. As with the
relative price of capital, we have little notion of how running out of
exhaustible forms of energy will affect the overall pace of techno-
logical progress, compared with the alternative scenario, and
some kind of neutrality assumption seems like a reasonable place
to begin the analysis.
Turning, ﬁnally, to some remaining issues, there are many
other features of the model that might legitimately be criticized.
For example, there is no treatment of uncertainty; there is no deep
reason to believe that the own rate of return to consumption
should be constant or that private and public rates should
8. For a more detailed explanation, with some calculations, see Nordhaus
[1995], Weitzman [1997], or Weitzman and Lo ¨fgren [1997].
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the technological progress residual into the future; the perfectly
competitive rational-expectations perfect-foresight story behind
the formation of Hotelling prices warrants much more scrutiny;
the effects of environmental externalities, like various forms of
pollution or congestion, are ignored by implicitly being held
constant in the background; the level of aggregation is so extreme
that every sector of every country in the world is being lumped
together as if having the same technology; and so forth, and so on.
To these, and yet other, criticisms, I can merely plead that this
model is intended only to deliver up a few rough theoretical
insights and to allow some crude empirical calculations to be
made about an important set of questions that had previously
gone largely unanswered. I think of this model primarily as
representingakindof‘‘base-case-neutral’’speciﬁcationforanalyz-
ing the overall effect of running out of minerals—in the loose
sense that it seems difficult to argue there exists here a systematic
bias pointing in one direction or the other.
The upshot of this brief discussion, I hope, is that the
(modiﬁed) theorem essentially holds as a reasonable base case
even for somewhat more complicated and realistic scenarios—
provided that the model is appropriately understood as an
approximation.
We turn now to the empirical part of the paper.
IV. HOW MUCH DO WE LOSE FROM RUNNING OUT OF MINERALS?
Having posed rigorously the question ‘‘What is the loss of glo-
bal welfare caused by exhaustion of mineral resources?’’ and hav-
ing answered it theoretically in a simple model, we now turn to
the primary task of the paper, which is to estimate it empirically.
We start this numerical exercise by closely following the
format of the main result.
World GDP in 1994 is estimated by the World Bank to be
$25.223 trillion.9 To convert into (conventionally measured) World
NDP, we use here the corresponding U. S. ratio for 1994, which is
NDPconventional/GDP , .88.10 With this same imputed ratio for
capital depreciation, our estimate for conventionally measured
world NDP in 1994 is $22.2 trillion.
9. World Bank [1996], p. 211.
10. USGNP (1994) 5 6932; USCNNP (1994) 5 6113 (in billion dollars).
Source: U. S. Commerce Department [1996], Table 1.9 on page D-4.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 702
Page702
@xyserv1/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec114-2/DIV_064a10 donnIn Table I are presented estimates of world Hotelling rents in
1994 for the fourteen most signiﬁcant exhaustible minerals.
Underlying data are from the 1997 World Bank study, Expanding
the Measure of Wealth.11 All in all, the price and quantity data
seem fairly reliable, with the weakest link here being the imputed
world shadow price for restricted-trading minerals like natural
gas and lignite.12 One can have qualms about assuming the
current price of oil or some other minerals to be an unbiased
estimate of the true shadow price, but there would have to be a
sizable discrepancy to inﬂuence the ﬁnal results of this paper. The
unit cost data are a measure of average cost of production,
including depreciation of ﬁxed assets and return on capital.13
They apparently were collected from a wide variety of sources of
11. I am indebted to Kirk Hamilton for making available to me the underlying
estimates of prices, quantities, and unit costs for each of the fourteen mineral
classes, but he should not be blamed for the way I have used them in this paper.
12. These are estimated by an f.o.b. export price index. See World Bank
[1997], p. 17.
13. See World Bank [1997], pp. 8 and 17.
TABLE I
WORLD RENTS, 1994
SOURCE: MODIFIED WORLD BANK ESTIMATES
Commodity Units
Price
($)
Unit
cost
($)
Marginal
cost ($)
Quantity
(thousands)
Hotelling
rents
(million $)
Crude oil metric tons 113 40.4 56.6 3,012,984 169,932
Natural
gas T-joules 2,133 684.5 958.3 95,925 112,683
Hard coal metric tons 40 29.6 32.6 3,967,054 29,356
Brown coal
(lignite) metric tons 11 8.5 9.4 1,119,937 1,792
Bauxite metric tons 33.8 13.2 14.5 132,315 2,554
Copper metric tons 2,330 1259.3 1,385.2 9,539 9,012
Iron ore metric tons 40 21.7 23.9 604,679 9,735
Lead metric tons 679 598.3 658.1 2,718 57
Nickel metric tons 6,278 4763.5 5,239.9 783 813
Phosphate metric tons 38 28.8 31.7 136,482 860
Tin metric tons 5,428 3826.4 4,209.0 166 202
Zinc metric tons 1,033 813.1 894.4 6,964 965
Gold kilograms 12,346 9838.8 10,822.7 1,741 2,651
Silver metric tons 169,872 117966.8 129,763.5 10 411
Total 341,023
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the purposes of this paper.
I estimate marginal cost to be about 40 percent higher than
unit (average) cost for crude oil and natural gas, while being about
10 percent higher for all remaining minerals in Table I. Such
estimates are loosely consistent with what other studies ﬁnd.14
While my guesstimates here are very rough indeed, little of
substance is hanging on exact values, which in any case are
impossible to pin down exactly.
Hotelling rents are then estimated as ‘‘price minus marginal
cost’’times ‘‘quantity.’’
The ratio of world Hotelling rents to conventionally measured
NDP in 1994 is then
(27) (P*(0) · E*(0))/(C*(0) 1 I*(0)) 5 .34/22.2 , 1.5%.
Turning to technological progress, it has been estimated,15 for
the period from about 1950 to the present, that, as a very rough
empirical approximation,
(28) (T*(0))/(C*(0) 1 I*(0)) , 40%.
If the ‘‘Solow residual’’ of nonimputed atmospheric change
continues to grow at about its postwar rate, so that (28) can be
extrapolated into a projection, then (26) yields
(29)
DW
W
, 1.1%.
It should be emphasized that alternative methods of estima-
tion, or different data, are unlikely to change the ‘‘big picture’’that
emerges from this numerical exercise. In particular, it is difficult
for me to think how DW/W could reasonably be made much larger
than an upper bound of, say, about 2 percent.
V. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Using the methodology of this paper, I estimate that the fact
that we happen to live in a world where all fourteen minerals
listed in Table I are exhaustible, rather than being renewable,
14. See, e.g., Pindyck [1978], Mueller [1985], Stollery [1983], and Pindyck
[1987].
15. See the very rough estimates in Weitzman [1997] and Weitzman and
Lo ¨fgren [1997], based on two different methodologies.
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average consumption each year.
How should we think about the outcome of this numerical
exercise? Does 1 percent of world consumption per year represent
a large or a small loss of welfare?
In absolute terms, 1 percent of world consumption represents
an enormous amount of goods and services, being equivalent
today to about 250 billion current dollars per year. Such an
amount exceeds the GDP of over 95 percent of the countries now
occupying seats in the U. N. General Assembly. If the world
economy grows at 2 percent per annum, the capitalized value of
forgone consumption at a 5 percent interest rate comes to over
eight trillion present dollars, which represents a truly staggering
welfare loss!
In relative terms, however, such numbers are not nearly big
enough to justify viewing ﬁniteness of world mineral reserves as
posing a serious limit to future growth of the world economy. I
think the relevant insight here is that the welfare correction to
NDPfor nonattributed technological change, although admittedly
but an extremely rough estimate, is maybe 40 times larger than
the required adjustment for depletion of exhaustible resources. In
some sense it might be said ﬁguratively that, other things being
equal, policy concerns about running out of oil should carry only
aboutone-fortieththeweightofpolicyconcernsabouttheeffective-
ness of R&D.
Of course, any conclusion is only as good as the assumptions
of the underlying model. As our workhorse model we have chosen
here the simplest imaginable hybrid of the standard Ramsey and
Hotelling formulations, with a touch of the Solow residual thrown
in. Then we rely heavily on market prices being decent indicators
of true scarcity values.And this is just the beginning of a long list
of built-in assumptions. It is quite legitimate to criticize many of
these assumptions. And, of course, different implications will
follow from different assumptions. Even so, I think the following
conclusion is fair.
In its amazingly compressed reduced form, the information
contained in the prices of minerals can be loosely translated as if
‘‘the market’’ is rendering its best judgment of the overall welfare
loss from running out of minerals. This is a judgment rendered not
by a computer-driven forecasting model, but by millions of actual
buyers and sellers staking their own private fortunes on the
outcome. With this loose interpretation, it seems as if ‘‘the market
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innovation that the ultimate exhaustion of nonrenewable re-
sources represents about a 1 percent diminution of our overall
consumption.
So long as human ingenuity is capable of such examples as
ﬁber optics, we will possibly never need all of the copper reserves
that theoretically exist. I think the spirit of the model is trying to
say to us that it sees a world which looks like this example. There
may well be serious limits to growth. But they are probably for
reasons other than exhaustion of standard mineral resources that
pass through the marketplace.
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